In this chapter, the concept of monitored and unmonitored memory and cognition is introduced, and behavioral as well as neurobiological fi ndings are used to link the application of these concepts in humans and other animals. Techniques are described that assess cognitive monitoring in nonverbal species, which indicate some of the putative differences in function associated with monitored and unmonitored cognition. Diffi culties in characterizing the mechanisms which support the monitoring of cognition are highlighted, and thoughts on how this work might best proceed are provided.
Introduction
Monitoring of cognitive processes may improve decision making by conditionalizing behavioral choices on the availability of needed knowledge. The dichotomy between memory that is accessible to monitoring (explicit) and that which is not (implicit) is at the theoretical core of human cognitive neuroscience. The explicit-implicit distinction has not, however, been systematically applied in nonhumans, creating a significant gap in our understanding of the relations between human and nonhuman cognition, and cognitive evolution in general. The failure to apply these concepts in nonhumans likely results from the fact that humans usually demonstrate access to cognitive processes by providing verbal commentaries on their experience of cognition that are not available from nonverbal animals. In the absence of parallel data from nonverbal animals, some have concluded that nonhuman species do not possess accessible memory (e.g., Tulving and Markowitsch 1994) , or that it is impossible to determine whether or not they do (Shettleworth 2010b) . However, new techniques using memory monitoring paradigms (Washburn et al. 2006; Hampton 2001; Smith et al. 2003; Hampton et al. 2004b; Kornell et al. 2007; Inman and Shettleworth 1999) may permit us to apply the explicit-implicit distinction in nonhuman species. Accessible explicit memory and cognition may be used more fl exibly in decision making than inaccessible knowledge and may be especially critical for planning. While some forms of metacognition depend on accessible explicit representations, many others do not, so all metacognition should not be equated with access to explicit cognition or memory. The connection between metacognition or memory monitoring and consciousness remains unclear and is probably beyond the scope of studies using nonhuman subjects. In future work, we should endeavor to move beyond functional demonstrations of metacognition and aim to identify the diversity of stimuli, cognitive processes, and neural substrates that explain it. This shift in focus will help develop an understanding of cognitive monitoring in both nonhumans and humans that is mechanistic and avoids invoking nonexplanatory homunculi.
Monitored and Unmonitored Memory and Cognition
Vertebrate brains are widely recognized to contain multiple individual memory systems, each specialized for different cognitive demands (Sherry and Schacter 1987; Cohen and Eichenbaum 1994) . In popular taxonomies of human memory systems, a major distinction is made between memory systems that are consciously accessible to monitoring (explicit or declarative) and those that are unconscious (Cohen and Eichenbaum 1994) . Human memory monitoring is associated with consciousness and is most often identified on the basis of verbal reports of private experience (e.g., "I knew" versus "I guessed"). Because nonhuman species cannot verbally report their experience of memory as do humans, it has been difficult to establish behavioral criteria that unambiguously capture the phenomenon of accessibility in nonhumans. Discriminating between accessible and inaccessible memory in nonhumans is further complicated by the fact that much learning and cognition in humans occurs without conscious awareness (e.g., some forms of classical conditioning, skill learning, and priming). It is not obvious a priori which kinds of learning and memory might require, or be associated with, cognitive access. Understanding this dimension of nonhuman memory, and the evolution of memory generally, therefore requires disciplined interpretation of studies designed to discriminate between accessible and inaccessible memory and cognition.
Extensive progress has been made in identifying the functional properties and the neural substrates of nonhuman memory, and this progress has been made without techniques for characterizing findings with respect to the accessibility of memories. Most of this work has been done under the (probably correct) assumption that phenomenal consciousness is not a helpful construct in studies of nonhumans because it is not clear what evidence would indicate the presence of such consciousness in nonhumans. Even as they focus on functional and mechanistic properties of memory, investigators often claim, directly or indirectly, that distinctions among memory systems establish parallels with conscious and unconscious memory in humans. For example, conscious memory is often identifi ed with cognitive fl exibility of the type that supports rapid adaptation to changing conditions, whereas unconscious memory may serve precisely honed but relatively infl exible behavior. When we focus on the most obviously functional traits of nonhuman memory, progress may appear to be rapid; however, our capacity to test for parallels between human and nonhuman memory would be greatly improved if behavioral criteria were established to capture the more subtle phenomena of accessibility. Determining which, if any, nonhuman memories are accessible to monitoring will allow us to sharpen distinctions between nonhuman memory systems and permit a better comparison of memory systems across species.
An objective study of cognitive processes must involve functional and mechanistic, rather than phenomenological, characterizations of the processes under study (Hampton 2001 (Hampton , 2005 Hampton et al. 2004b; Shettleworth 2010b) . A functional approach might begin by posing the question (e.g., Shea and Heyes 2010): What can an organism with memory awareness do that one without it cannot do? In answering this question we can arrive at operational defi nitions of memory access that capture important functional capacities while avoiding the pitfalls associated with attempts to study phenomenology in nonverbal species. Such an approach is also directly relevant to the functional features upon which evolution can act in selecting for specifi c characteristics of memory systems. For memory monitoring to have evolved by natural selection, it must have had behavioral benefi ts that improved the ability to survive and reproduce. Memory monitoring allows humans to discriminate between knowing and not knowing. For example, when making a phone call, humans are able to determine whether or not they know the number before dialing and adapt their course of action: call when the number is known versus select a different course of action (e.g., look up the number, delay the call, send email) when it is unknown.
In traditional tests of memory in nonhuman animals, subjects are given "forced-choice" tests which require them to do their best based on the available information. In such tests there are no behavioral options analogous to a human looking up a phone number when uncertain. However, paradigms do exist that allow animals alternatives, thus more precisely paralleling situations in which humans make adaptive choices based on memory monitoring. A subset of these paradigms arguably allows us to discriminate between explicit and implicit memory in nonverbal species. In some of these experiments, rhesus monkeys are given a choice between taking a memory test and declining the test, which is analogous to a human saying "I remember" or "I forgot," respectively. Monkeys demonstrate that they can accurately monitor memory in these paradigms by either selectively declining tests or by gathering more information, when their memory is poor during the test. (Kornell et al. 2007; Hampton 2001; Hampton et al. 2004b; Smith et al. 2003; Smith et al. 2006 
Interaction among Memory Systems
Understanding how different memory systems act together or independently to control decision making and behavior poses a major challenge in the study of the brain's multiple memory systems (Packard and McGaugh 1996; McDonald and White 1993) . Multiple memory systems participate in even "simple" behavioral experiments. In a particularly clear example, rats were trained in a plus-shaped maze to start from the same location in each trial and travel to a consistently baited arm of the maze (Packard and McGaugh 1996) . Because the same start and goal arms were used across training trials, rats could solve the maze by learning either to navigate to a particular place in the room (as defi ned by landmarks; that is, a place strategy), or by learning to turn in a particular direction (e.g., turn right; that is, a response strategy). On probe trials the rats started from the arm directly opposite the start location used on training trials. These probe trials tested whether the rats were using the place or response strategy because the two strategies resulted in entry into opposite arms of the maze. Early in training, rats used a place strategy, but after extensive training they followed the response rule. Furthermore, by inactivating the dorsal striatum or hippocampus on probe trials it was found that the place strategy required the hippocampus whereas the response strategy required the dorsal striatum. Most interesting was the fi nding that inactivation of the striatum after extensive training resulted in the clear expression of the place strategy again, demonstrating that both the place and response strategies were available but that under normal conditions, the response strategy controls behavior late in training. This pattern of the development of automaticity parallels in some ways the development of human expertise and may underlie the diffi culty experts can encounter when trying to describe the basis of their performance to a novice. Experts may often lack easy introspective access to the cognitive basis of their performance. Other animal work strongly suggests that multiple simultaneously active memory systems are the rule rather than the exception. If this is indeed the case, then understanding most forms of decision making will require identifi cation of the specifi c memory systems involved and understanding of the interactions among them. Essentially no work has addressed the extent to which interacting memory systems are differentially accessible to monitoring in nonhumans species. Determining the extent to which cognitive monitoring plays a role in controlling the expression of memory systems in nonhumans will likely inform our understanding of decision making.
The Hippocampus
The hippocampus is widely recognized to play a critical role in the expression of many accessible memories in humans. The accessibility of spatial memory has not been studied in nonhumans. However, across species as diverse as fi sh, birds, rats, and primates, the role of the hippocampus in supporting the memories underlying spatial navigation is well established (Rodriguez et al. 2002; Hampton et al. 2004a ). This extensive conservation of the spatial function of the vertebrate hippocampus begs for specifi cation of the extent to which other functions of the hippocampus, including support of accessible memory, have also been conserved through evolution. Recent work on the role of the hippocampus in human nonspatial memory indicates that the contribution of the hippocampus may be critical but quite circumscribed (Hampton and Schwartz 2004; Vargha-Khadem et al. 2001) . Hippocampal damage in humans causes robust and devastating memory defi cits. However, studies of so-called developmental amnesics with extensive hippocampal damage show that they can develop normal language, IQ, and can succeed in school. Despite these competencies, developmental amnesics almost completely lack episodic memory (i.e., the ability to remember events as having occurred in one's own past). In contrast to these clear defi cits in episodic memory seen in humans, some studies of nonspatial memory in monkeys with hippocampal damage fi nd no defi cits whatsoever (Murray and Mishkin 1998) . This difference in the ease with which nonspatial memory impairments are detected in humans and monkeys shows that measuring some functions of the hippocampus in nonhumans, such as a possible role in episodic memory, can be challenging and may require the development of new behavioral tests. Whether or not a specifi c memory test measures hippocampal function may depend on subtle differences in training and testing procedures that bias monkeys toward different approaches to memory testing (Zola et al. 2000) . Our current tests for nonhumans fail to measure important components of memory. It has been proposed that the hippocampus is critical for performance in recall tests, whereas adjacent cortex supports recognition test performance based on familiarity (e.g., Eichenbaum et al. 2007; Sauvage et al. 2008; Brown and Aggleton 2001; Ranganath et al. 2004 ). At present, there are no widely applicable recall tests for nonhumans, though some elegant paradigms do suggest a distinction between familiarity and another memory process in nonhumans. Rats with hippocampal lesions displayed intact recognition of previously presented odors but, unlike control rats, they could not correctly identify the order in which odors were presented (Fortin et al. 2002) . This dissociation suggests that nonhuman animals may have a memory system similar to that which supports recall in humans. However, further studies are needed before this issue can be resolved. Studies of memory monitoring have the potential to contribute to measurements of recall in nonhumans.
Work on memory monitoring in monkeys (Hampton 2001; Smith et al. 1998; Kornell et al. 2007 ) arguably demonstrates that monkeys have access to at least some types of memory and that they use this access to discriminate between knowing and not knowing. In addition, because monkeys can at least sometimes adaptively choose to take or decline a memory test even before it appears, monkeys may base their decision about whether to take a test or not on whether they can successfully recall a studied image even in the absence of the image (Hampton 2001; Figures 8.1 and 8.2) . The ability to recall memories may have implications for planning and decision making, because recall performance is much less directly tied to currently experienced stimuli. Recall can take place when animals are spatially or temporally distant from a decision point, exactly when planning would be most useful. The three rows in the fi gure represent three possible mechanisms underlying private memory monitoring. The two columns depict the target of monitoring when the monkeys choose to take ("yes") or avoid ("no") the test. The fi rst row depicts the simplest mechanism for memory monitoring: a "memory fl ag" indicates the presence or absence of memory, but the contents of memory are inaccessible. The "image retrieval" model proposes that the monkeys attempt to "bring to mind" the sample image: if the retrieved image is clear, the monkey chooses to take the test; if it is degraded or blank, the monkey declines the test. In the "episodic retrieval" model, the monkey either recovers details of the study episode and takes the test, or fails to retrieve these details and avoids the test.
Relation to Planning
A conspicuous feature of planning is that it requires the processing of stimuli which are not currently present. Planning is thus critically dependent on memory. While imagination can construct representations of events that have not, and may never, transpire, memories provide the raw material for these constructions. Many researchers have emphasized the importance of memory, and the neural substrates for memory, in planning (e.g., Buckner 2010). Indeed, memory of the past exists to promote successful behavior in the present and future. Natural selection could not act on the ability to remember the past unless it promoted adaptive behavior, for idle reminiscence is a waste of energy from an evolutionary point of view. While the inaccessible memories suffi cient to support skills like those needed for food processing or prey capture certainly prepare animals for future behavioral needs, such memories probably cannot enter into planning as we normally think of it. Accessible memories appear to be subject to manipulation in fl exible ways not evident with inaccessible memories, for example in making transitive inferences (Smith and Squire 2005). Such fl exibility and manipulability would support the mental exploration of options to permit effective planning. More concretely, knowing what you know is important in situations in which specifi c knowledge will be required for upcoming behavior, as described by the earlier example about deciding whether to dial a number, look up the number fi rst, or use email. Such an example seems to qualify as shortterm planning, at least, and the logic would extend to longer-term planning.
Relation to Decision Making
Except in a few limited circumstances, such as deciding whether to take a test based on whether you know the answer, there are few cases where access to memory is obviously necessary for adaptive decision making. It is possible, but not demonstrated to my knowledge, that memory monitoring aids in contrasting alternative courses of action even when these alternatives do not differ in terms of required knowledge. Humans certainly ponder alternatives consciously, especially when uncertain, but the nearly automatic decision-making process of true experts may be generally more effective. It seems clear that access is often involved during the learning of new skills (e.g., driving), where initially a great deal of mental "supervision" is required. However, it is much less obvious why access is required initially, particularly when expert behavior is less dependent on access.
Examples that highlight the importance of memory monitoring in humans are relatively easily generated. For nonhuman animals outside of the laboratory, it is less obvious how access to knowledge contributes to adaptive behavior in ways that could not be accomplished without access. Developing an inventory of natural situations in which nonhumans would benefi t from memory monitoring would be a signifi cant contribution to this area of research. Such an inventory would begin to capture the important functional capacities provided by access and would establish a solid basis for the comparative study of memory monitoring. In developing this inventory, it is probably important to distinguish between the types of experimental situations necessary to demonstrate memory monitoring and the sorts of situations arising in nature in which memory monitoring would be of adaptive value. Ideal experimental conditions prevent subjects from solving the experimental problem by any means other than memory monitoring; thus success demonstrates memory monitoring. Such restrictive conditions would not be necessary for memory monitoring to evolve. Rather, memory monitoring need only provide a selective advantage in some problem domain, not a unique solution. For example, nest parasitic cowbird females scout for nests of other birds that contain some eggs, but not a complete clutch, in which to lay their own egg the following morning. It might be adaptive for a cowbird to stop scouting for nests and return to foraging for food, as soon as she has located and memorized the locations of one or two that are suitable. Metacognition could be useful in determining when this state of sufficient knowledge has been achieved, but other mechanisms (e.g., shifting from scouting to foraging whenever a threshold level of hunger is reached) might also provide a somewhat less fi ne-tuned, but effective, solution. Whether metacognition would evolve in this situation is not determined by it being the only solution to the problem, but rather by it providing an adaptive advantage over other solutions suffi cient to outweigh the costs in terms of neural structure, brain metabolism, and other investments required to support it.
Relation between Memory Monitoring and Metacognition
Memory monitoring is just one type of metacognition. Often loosely defined as "thinking about thinking" (e.g., Flavell 1979), metacognition allows one to monitor and adaptively control cognitive processing (Nelson 1996) . Monitoring and control of cognition could be manifest in a number of ways, including the regulation of time spent studying, reviewing, or seeking more information when forgetting has occurred, or the selective avoidance of situations where information is required but not available. In humans, metacognition is commonly associated with conscious introspection. In some contexts (e.g., in educational research), it refers, however, to the capacity to monitor or control the status of cognition by almost any means. Such a broad defi nition has both positive and negative consequences: It prevents "hair-splitting" arguments and allows investigators to continue their work without getting defused by arguments about the status of specific putative cases of metacognition. However, it may also conceal distinctive features of specific instances of metacognition that make them unusual and exciting.
What Does Metacognitive Behavior Tell Us about Cognitive Systems?
Metacognition in humans is often associated with conscious awareness of one's own cognitive states (e.g., Nelson 1996; Koriat 1996) and is therefore presumed to refl ect private monitoring of those states. Monitoring can be accomplished using discriminative stimuli that can be categorized into two types: Private monitoring depends on the privileged access of the subject to its own cognitive state. Public monitoring depends on discriminative stimuli, such as the perceivable diffi culty of a problem or the subject's reinforcement history with particular material, to control the metacognitive response in an adaptive manner. Consider the following: (a) a colleague asks whether you remember the title of B. F. Skinner's first book; (b) a friend asks whether you can answer a question that his six year old has about psychology. In the fi rst case, you would attempt to retrieve a memory of the book title and privately monitor the success or failure of that attempt. If you were able to bring the title to mind, it would be clear to you (though not yet to anyone else) that you were successful, and you could confi dently reply, "Yes, I remember the title." Your metacognitive judgment, therefore, depends on your success or failure at privately retrieving the relevant explicit memory. The specifi city and privacy of this example contrasts with the second case, in which your friend has not even asked you to retrieve a specifi c memory. If you are an expert in psychology, you might feel confi dent that you can answer the question of a six year old. Your confi dence would not depend on a private evaluation of your ability to retrieve any particular memory, but rather on knowledge of your expertise, your past ability to answer such questions, and your assessment of the intellectual capacity of six year olds. Your friend's judgment about your ability to answer correctly would be about as accurate as your own. Indeed, he probably consulted you because he believes that you possess a particular level of expertise. By contrast, the introspecting individual has a distinct advantage over others in accurately evaluating the success of a completed or ongoing attempt at retrieving a specifi c memory because they alone know what has been privately "brought to mind." Accurate predictions of performance, even when subjects predict their own behavior, should not be equated with introspection or use of private information-such predictions result from the use of private or public information.
Understanding the mechanisms of metacognition in nonhumans requires more than a demonstration of accurate monitoring. Progress will depend on the development of experimental procedures that allow us to specify what information subjects use to assess their ability to remember or perform, and how they use that information. At least four possible classes of stimuli could be effective for cognitive control and will be summarized briefl y here. Future work might benefi t from considering this framework for contrasting the possible cognitive mechanisms that underpin metacognition. Although this review focuses on experiments that involve nonhuman subjects, it is probable that this reasoning extends to humans as well.
Environmental Cue Associations
Some stimuli are more diffi cult to discriminate or remember than others, as are some test conditions more challenging than others. Stimulus magnitude, image similarity, and delay interval are all types of publicly available information that indicate the diffi culty of a particular test trial. Subjects performing tests with such stimuli might use the identity, magnitude, similarity, delay, or other publicly available information as a discriminative cue for declining tests or rating confi dence. For example, if subjects have experienced low rates of reward with stimuli in a specifi c magnitude range, they could learn to avoid tests with all stimuli in that range (for the same argument, see Kornell et al. 2007; Shettleworth and Sutton 2003; cf. Smith et al. 2006) . In a somewhat more subtle version of this account, extra-experimental events which might interfere with attention or performance (e.g., randomly occurring noises in the test environment, itches, or bouts of auto-grooming) can become discriminative stimuli for the metacognitive response (e.g., Hampton 2001 Hampton , 2005 . Generalization tests are the best way to evaluate the contribution of environmental cue associations to metacognitive performance. If performance generalizes immediately to new test conditions or new stimuli, it is safe to conclude that metacognitive responding was not controlled by stimuli that were changed for the generalization test.
Behavioral Cue Associations
This account of metacognitive behavior is similar to environmental cue associations, with the exception that the discriminative stimuli controlling the use of the metacognitive response are systematically generated by the subject in a way that correlates with accuracy in the primary task. For example, subjects may vacillate when they do not know the correct response on a given test (Tolman 1948) . Vacillation might refl ect the subjects' introspection that they do not know the answer, but it may just as likely be an unmediated result of not knowing how to respond. Because vacillation and response latency correlate with accuracy, subjects can use these self-generated cues as discriminative stimuli for the metacognitive response, for example, by declining tests on which they experience a relatively long response latency. In this case, the subject does not introspectively "know they do not know," but rather they "know they are slow." Response latency can be eliminated as a discriminative cue by using prospective metacognitive judgments, in which subjects choose to take or decline tests before seeing them and therefore before the latency of any response is available (see Figure 8 .1).
Response Competition
In most reports of metacognition in nonhumans, subjects are confronted with the primary discrimination problem or memory test and the secondary metacognitive response option simultaneously (see Figure 8.3; Smith et al. 1995; Smith et al. 1998; Shields et al. 1997; Hampton et al. 2004b; expt. 1 in Inman and Shettleworth 1999; Call and Carpenter 2001; Basile et al. 2008; Washburn et al. 2006) . Because subjects can only make one response (a primary test response or a secondary decline test response), simultaneous presentation puts these two behaviors in direct competition. On trials with no prepotent primary test response, the probability that the subject will make the secondary metacognitive decline test response is greater, simply because no other competing response occurs immediately. On correct trials, when the inclination to make a primary test response is strong, it may dominate the tendency to decline the test. Response competition can be ruled out as an account for metacognitive responding by presenting the secondary metacognitive response option either before or after the primary test, so that the two types of response do not compete directly (Hampton 2001; Kornell et al. 2007 ).
Introspection
Metacognition could also be mediated by a private, introspective assessment of the subject's mental states. By the introspection account, the discriminative stimulus controlling a metacognitive response (e.g., declining to take a test) is the private experience of uncertainty (Smith et al. 2003) or the weakness of memory (Hampton 2001 (Hampton , 2005 . Memory assessment might be accomplished through several mechanisms, which vary in sophistication from detecting whether a memory is present (while knowing nothing of the content of the memory) to attempting to retrieve the relevant memory and determining the success of that effort (Figure 8 .2). The important difference between this account and the preceding three is that use of the metacognitive response is based on privileged introspective access to the subject's cognitive states, rather than on publicly available information or response competition. Introspection is probably the most interesting and most controversial mechanism for metacognitive performance because it invokes access to mental states. As such, it is potentially a tool for distinguishing between implicit and explicit mental processes in nonhumans.
Relation to Implicit and Explicit Representation
Some investigators may want to limit the use of the term metacognition to cases where conscious awareness and introspection can be inferred, and many might argue that private introspective metacognition is the most interesting case. Certainly, private introspective metacognition has the most potential to establish parallels between human explicit and implicit memory and nonhuman memory systems. Thus, paradigms that rule out adaptive control by public mechanisms are of high interest, yet it appears that only a minority of studies have done this to date.
If the study of metacognition is motivated by the possibility that it provides a means for studying something akin to introspection in animals, then we need to be thorough in our use of procedures that rule out other sources of stimulus control. Studies of meta-memory, in particular, are aimed at determining whether we can make a distinction between implicit and explicit mental representations in nonhuman species that parallel those made in humans (Hampton 2001 (Hampton , 2003 (Hampton , 2005 (Hampton , 2006 Hampton and Hampstead 2006; Hampton et al. 2004b ). Perhaps the fi rst studies to address explicit representation in nonhumans were the " blindsight" studies done in monkeys (Cowey and Stoerig 1995; for later studies, see Cowey 2010). These studies demonstrated that monkeys can accurately localize a stimulus even when they report that no stimulus is present in a present-absent discrimination. Similar techniques were subsequently used in experiments that assessed metacognitive abilities. These demonstrations depend on the capacity of subjects to make what Weiskrantz (2001) terms a "commentary response," which is interpreted to refl ect some assessment by subjects of their subjective perceptual experience. It may still be premature to conclude that any case of observed metacognition in nonhumans depends on introspection involving explicit representations, but when sources of public stimulus control are eliminated, it is more likely that introspection underlies metacognitive performance.
Comparative Psychology
Although there have been many reports of metacognition in rhesus monkeys (e.g., Hampton 2001; Kornell et al. 2007; Smith et al. 2003) , work with pigeons has been much less successful (Inman and Shettleworth 1999; Sole et al. 2003; Sutton and Shettleworth 2008; Roberts et al. 2009 ). Capuchin monkeys show the weakest evidence for metacognition of any primate species tested (Call and Carpenter 2001; Hampton et al. 2004b; Basile et al. 2008; Smith et al. 2006) . It is tempting to interpret these differences as indicating that metacognitive control is not "easy," that it is unlikely to come about through "simple" associative learning (of which pigeons and capuchins are certainly capable), and that it may be restricted to relatively few species. However, it is still too early to reach such conclusions, as a host of species characteristics may interfere with performance in metacognitive tests (e.g., differences in attention, impulse control, and motivation). A variety of studies using divergent methods to converge on the same results will be required before any fi rm comparative conclusions can be reached.
Relation to Consciousness
Consciousness is particularly vexing for those working with nonhuman animals. In human research, conscious access to cognitive processes is often readily inferred, correctly or not, on the basis of verbal reports. Nonhuman animals cannot provide the verbal reports that we find to be compelling evidence of consciousness when emitted by humans. Thus, given this lack of language, it is widely thought that it is impossible to find evidence of consciousness in nonhuman animals. A consequence is that using any evidence, including evidence of metacognition, to infer consciousness in nonhuman animals is controversial. This problem is probably best reduced to some variant of the question (Shea and Heyes 2010; Hampton 2005) : What can an animal with consciousness do that one without it cannot do? Formulating the problem this way highlights the difficulty of specifying any functional role for consciousness in cognition. Although consciousness is correlated with some cognitive capacities in humans, it is far from clear how phenomenal consciousness contributes to cognitive processes. Absent specification of this contribution, it is impossible to determine what evidence from a nonhuman animal would indicate consciousness. If verbal commentary and consciousness are not available to identify metacognition in nonhuman animals, what criteria do apply? The general definition of monitoring and control of cognition provides a way forward: metacognition is evident in nonhuman animals if they adaptively monitor or control their cognition. A growing body of evidence demonstrates these capacities in nonhumans, at least as most broadly defined. However, to the extent that our interest in metacognition and memory monitoring results from the desire to establish parallels between human and nonhuman memory systems, metacognition paradigms that have the capacity to rule out public mechanisms for metacognition must be adopted. Only tests that do so have the potential to establish the presence of explicit memory in nonhumans.
